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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Succession insecurity manifests in many forms 
This autumn has delivered a full-spectrum extravaganza of political surprises in 
Russian politics.  However, as the spectacle continues to unfold, there is an 
uneasy sense that not even its principals know how it all will end. 
 
What seems evident is that the promotion of two putatively primary successors, 
Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev, exacerbated rifts within the ruling elite, and 
conceivably hastened a flow of authority away from President Putin.  His strategy 
for correcting such a trend was a sudden shift from the course of hand-picked 
successor(s) to a reassertion of his dominance on the political scene.  The 
resignation of the government and selection of Viktor Zubkov as prime minister 
had the primary effect of rattling the patronage tails of both his former main 
successor-candidates and those of their allies and adversaries.  
 
With the Ivanov-Medvedev contest for succession, the Russian executive had 
settled into a conflict between camps both in favor of their chosen candidates 
and in opposition to one another.  With the focus of that struggle removed, 
operations—notably corruption investigations and financial transactions—
undertaken within that paradigm, suddenly ricochet with scattershot and produce 
unintended consequences.  
 
The arrests that sparked GAK Chief Viktor Cherkesov to air chekisty laundry in 
public likely are aftereffects of the succession struggle and Putin's sudden 
change of course. (For a more detailed discussion of Cherkesov's article, please 
see The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XIV, No. 4.)  
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President Putin's decision to quash the Ivanov-Medvedev competition for 
successor, at least for the time being, has produced a void that he seems to be 
struggling to fill.  Soon after announcing that he would head United Russia and 
possibly the Government, the campaign to win a significant electoral victory for 
United Russia in the December polls, and with it a mandate for the president, 
began in earnest. 
 
If there was any doubt about United Russia maintaining independence of 
leadership from the Kremlin, it was quashed as the Kremlin invited Duma leaders 
for a meeting to discuss what should be done in the next Duma and whether or 
not "United Russia has been working properly in the Duma so far." (1)  While 
attempts to determine whether Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration 
Vladislav Surkov actually had issued any directives to the invited MPs were 
unsuccessful, nonetheless it seems clear that campaign strategy, namely, the 
emphasis on President Putin and his "Plan" (as yet unspecified), along with a 
general theme emphasized by Surkov that "action is more important than any 
personal impression any of you make" was "discussed" at the Kremlin meeting. 
(2) 
 
By late-October, pro-Putin rallies were organized in select regions across Russia: 
"October 23 in Volgograd and Petropavolsk-Kamchatsky….  October 24 in 
Grozny, Gudermes, Achkoi-Martan, Tver, Vologda and Novyi Urengoi; on 
October 25 in Magadan and Pskov; on October 26 in Khanty-Mansiisk; on 
October 27 in Novosibirsk and Great Novgorod; on October 28 in Yakutsk; on 
October 31 in Rostov-on-Don; on November 1 in Chita; on November 2 in Rzhev, 
Petrozavodsk, Kaliningrad, and Yekaterinburg." (3)  The hallmark of all the rallies 
was a call for the president to continue to lead the country. 
 
The importance of December's parliamentary elections has been magnified by 
Putin's announcement that he considers them to be a referendum on his 
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leadership: "If people vote for United Russia, it means that a clear majority…put 
their trust in me, and in turn that means I will have the moral right to hold those in 
the Duma and the Cabinet responsible for the implementation of the tasks that 
have been set…." Putin continued, "In what form I will do this, I cannot yet give a 
direct answer.  But various possibilities exist." (4) 
 
It is precisely the vagaries of Putin's assertions that he will continue to lead 
Russia beyond the end of his second presidential term that continues to shift the 
ground under his ruling "corporation" or apparatchiki.  
 
According to some speculation, Putin is considering a role without formal title or 
authority.  Erstwhile Kremlin ideologist Gleb Pavlovsky suggests, "It's not 
necessary for Putin to have any kind of regalia.  The important point is that he 
should be able to call a meeting to include the president, prime minister, the 
speakers of both houses of parliament…and pursue coordinated policy-making." 
(5)  Theoretically, Putin's personal popularity, along with tight control of the 
security organs (and that chekist esprit de corps!) would outweigh the 
constitutional authority of the officers with whom he would "coordinate" according 
to this scenario. 
 
While the president mulls his role beyond 2008, he must also consider in whom 
to place his trust.  The fall's political surprises have left his presumed closest 
advisers as bit players in a drama they seemed destined to lead.  The rapid shifts 
of presidential policies have left at least one insider to claim, "Russia's federal 
decision-making center has contracted to the size of President Putin's head." (6) 
 
This is a dangerous moment for President Putin:  He has staked his personal 
reputation and future on the outcome of elections (perhaps more pointedly, on 
the competency of regional campaign officials), at exactly the moment when he 
has removed potential scapegoats from office.  Additionally, by linking the 
electoral vote for United Russia to his own personal "moral right" to lead, he has 
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opened himself to personal attacks, masked as attacks on United Russia.  One 
need read only the differing accounts of one presidential campaign stop, 13 
November in Krasnoyarsk for example, to understand the power of the media, 
even in such a restricted environment, to show the devil in the details. (7) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "A Directive from the Kremlin," by Kira Latukhina, 7 Nov 07, Vedomosti; What 
the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) "Stay or Go: The working masses demand that Putin should stay at the helm," 
Itogi, No.45, 5-11 Nov 07; WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) "Putin Gives Sign that He'll Retain Power," Steve Gutterman, Associated 
Press, 13 Nov 07 via David Johnson's Russia List, 14 Nov 07. 
(5) Gleb Pavlovsky as cited in "Stay or Go," Itogi,  Ibid.  
(6) "Everything Decided at the Top," Mikhail Rostovsky, Moskovskii 
komsomolets, No. 242, 25 Oct 07; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. (He cites an unnamed 
former government official.) 
(7) "Putin Gives Sign," Steve Gutterman, Ibid; "United Russia may Not Be Very 
Good, But No Party Is Better," ITAR-TASS, 14 Nov 07 via JRL, 2007-#237, 15 
Nov 07; "Putin on Putin: Couldn't Be Better," by Andrei Kolesnikov, Kommersant, 
14 Nov 07 via JRL, 2007-#236, 14 Nov 07; "Campaign Debates are Affecting the 
Media," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 Nov 07 via JRL 2007-#237, 15 Nov 07. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Launching Saint Petersburg 
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One Thursday in October, Tony Kettle, an architect and managing director of the 
UK-based RMJM Group, visited Harvard University's Graduate School of Design 
to talk about one of his firm’s most spectacular projects – a twisting glass spire 
that is projected to rise above a business complex and pierce the sky over Saint 
Petersburg sometime around 2016. (1) The cost and scale of the project—
estimates reach 2.3 billion dollars and 1,300 feet—would normally arouse 
skepticism in the audience's gray-haired pragmatists, used to seeing grand 
architectural ambitions whittled down by miserly clients and sluggish bureaucrats. 
This building, however, promises to be exceptional. Prosaic concerns like money 
and politics don't seem to factor into the plans in the usual way because this 
building is designed to represent the very quintessence of money and politics in 
Russia – it is to be the headquarters of Gazprom Neft, the newly formed oil 
division of Russia's state-controlled energy company. The audience was duly 
impressed by the wealth of resources lavished on the design firm by Gazprom, 
the world's fourth largest company, for the construction of its world-class 
corporate complex. Most of the question and answer period that followed the 
lecture was spent addressing wistful inquiries about the building's state-of-the-art 
glass panels, which will be, Kettle assured the assembly, "quite expensive." (2)  
             
Glass skin, folded gently into an origami pentagon and twisted upward into an 
elongated spiral, is the signature material chosen by architects at RMJM to allow 
the maximum amount of natural sunlight to pour into the building and to reflect 
back the sky from the outside. The firm promises a constant spectacle of light 
and shadow at play over the surface of the building; depending upon the position 
of the sun and the movement of clouds, the tower can change color ten times 
every day. (3) Constantly shifting light, reflection and refraction are meant to 
evoke the image of water, and to mirror the River Neva, on the banks of which 
the new complex, known officially as "Gazprom City," will stand. Of course, the 
building’s plastic form is subject to the vagaries of its viewers’ imaginations, and 
where some see water, others see fire. Images of the proposed building released 
to the media led several journalists to remark upon the spiral’s likeness to a 
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distended blue flame – a tantalizing interpretation given Gazprom’s corporate 
logo: a blue flame. (4) While he denies that the architectural rendering of his 
client’s corporate emblem is intentional, Kettle will acknowledge that the 
company’s identity as an energy leader inspired the building's designers in the 
initial planning stages. "Gazprom is one of the world's most important energy 
companies and it is fitting that in a city of spires, this new spire should symbolize 
the importance of energy," he explained. (5)  
             
As for the client, Aleksei Miller, chief executive at Gazprom, has remarked with 
evident satisfaction upon the building's striking symbolism, calling the tower, “a 
new economic symbol of Saint Petersburg.” (6) Miller trumpets his company's 
investment in Russia’s former imperial capital as the fuel that will propel the city’s 
provincial economy forward into the strategic sectors of tomorrow’s global 
marketplace. His supersonic scenario represents an economic renaissance that 
has been the pet project of Saint Petersburg’s favorite son, President Vladimir 
Putin, over the course of the past four years. 
 
With hindsight it can be said that during his two terms as Russia's president, 
Putin adopted three pets into the Kremlin: the Federal Security Service (FSB), 
Gazprom and the litter of renationalized strategic-sector companies it 
engendered, as well as the country's neglected northern capital of Saint 
Petersburg. All three played a formative role in the pre-presidential chapters of 
Putin’s biography. The former KGB agent devoted his doctoral thesis to the 
project of renationalizing the nation’s strategic mineral resources. His graduate 
work, and his subsequent career in the office of the Mayor of Saint Petersburg, 
put him in contact with a cadre of proud, like-minded natives of Russia’s northern 
capital who celebrate the vestiges of imperial splendor on display throughout the 
city, and who tacitly embrace the former capital’s imperial scope as a blueprint 
for contemporary Russia. 
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When Putin came to Moscow in the 1990s, he arrived in the Kremlin without a 
power base. Throughout his eight years as president, he has used the northern 
city as a talent pool from which to draw his personal recruits. These ranks of 
northern clients and loyalists share Putin’s commitment to Saint Petersburg and 
have served as a network through which he channels federal largesse northward. 
(7) 
 
Gazprom's bold spire may be the most conspicuous signal that a northern 
migration is on the horizon for Russia's power-brokers, but it is by no means the 
only new corporate arrival to Saint Petersburg in recent years. In 2004, several 
large national enterprises, enticed by the governor of Saint Petersburg Valentina 
Matviyenko and nudged by the Kremlin, simultaneously shifted their operations 
north from Moscow. Vneshtorgbank, Sovkomflot and Transnefteprodukt re-
registered their headquarters in Saint Petersburg, while two of Russia's energy 
majors: LUKoil and Rosneft, established branch offices in the city. (8) 
 
Foreign investors eager to buy into Russia’s lucrative market also have been 
pointed to Saint Petersburg as the place to risk their money, but the clearest 
evidence of Putin’s personal involvement in the city’s development is found in 
several recent federal initiatives. In March of this year, the city benefited from the 
consolidation of the Russian state’s shipbuilding assets into a single financial 
holding—Unified Shipbuilding Corporation—that will be headquartered in the 
northern capital. (9) In September, Putin directed the Russian Defense Ministry 
to draw up plans to transfer the Admiralty of the Russian Navy to the northern 
port city, giving a tremendous boost to its maritime industrial capacity. (10) While 
individual munificence has played a part in Putin’s moves to bolster his 
hometown’s maritime industry, his decisions also appear to have been guided by 
factors that reach well beyond the River Neva. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia 
have become restive as Russia and Germany hammer out terms for the 
construction of a pipeline that will bypass the Baltic States to deliver gas directly 
to Western Europe. Saint Petersburg is a strategically attractive lookout point to 
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monitor and, if need be, to repress the ambitions of the Balts. At the same time, 
Russia has begun to explore the arctic sea shelf in earnest, in a race to lay claim 
to whatever resources might become extractable there. That endeavor will 
require specialized ships, sea platforms and maritime equipment. Again, Saint 
Petersburg is perched at the edge of the great, lucrative beyond. 
 
The northern capital has been a major beneficiary of the Putin Presidency. The 
president, in turn, has gained by the revitalization of his hometown. With the 
installation of Gazprom Neft, Putin launched his native city into one of the 
country's major economic channels and in so doing, he launched his own 
personal ship of state. From the spire that will rise over the second capital, Putin 
can, if he chooses, calmly observe the ruckus that breaks out in Moscow 
following the election of Russia’s new president. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Lecture by Peter Morrison and Tony Kettle of RMJM Group at Harvard 
University Graduate School of Design, 11 Oct 07 via 
http://www.gsd.harvard.edu/events/lectures/past_lectures.html Image of building 
via http://www.e-
architect.co.uk/moscow/jpgs/gazprom_sunset_rmjm1206glocg.jpg. 
(2) Ibid., Author's notes. 
(3) RMJM website via http://www.rmjm.com/index_flash.php. 
(4) Finn, Peter, “Planned Tower Splits Venerable Russian City,” Washington 
Post, 19 Feb 07 via http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/18/AR2007021801294.html. 
(5) Lecture by Peter Morrison and Tony Kettle of RMJM Group at Harvard 
University Graduate School of Design, 11 Oct 07 via 
http://www.gsd.harvard.edu/events/lectures/past_lectures.html. 
(6) Stolyarova, Galina, "Will New Gazprom Tower Wreck Saint Pete?" 




(7) Halpern, Tony, “Putin bestows more largesse on his beloved St Petersburg,” 
Times Online, 2 Nov 07 via 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2789079.ece. 




(9) Dranitsyna, Yekaterina, “Matviyenko Reaches Out For State Shipbuilding 
HQ,” Saint Petersburg Times, 13 Mar 07 via 
http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=20959&highlight=Matviye
nko  
(10) Halpern, Tony, “Putin bestows more largesse on his beloved St Petersburg,” 




Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Korabelnikov’s warning: Hands off GRU!  
On 2 November, GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye, the General 
Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate) Chief General Valentin Korabelnikov led a 
delegation of officers to a meeting with President Vladimir Putin. The purpose of 
the occasion was to mark Military Intelligence Officer Day, due to take place 
three days later. During the ceremony, President Putin presented the GRU Chief 
with a Hero of Russia medal to commemorate the career and service of Zhorzh 
Koval. (1) Koval, an American who died at age 94 in 2006, was a key GRU 
operative who succeeded in penetrating US atomic laboratories, and passing 
vital information to Moscow. Koval’s operations apparently allowed the Soviet 
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Union to advance its own nuclear weapons program significantly. (2) Speaking at 
the reception, Korabelnikov thanked Putin for his “recognition of the 
achievements” of an “extraordinary person,” and for his “respect” for “all Russian 
military intelligence officers.” (3)  
    
Although the ceremony was largely given over to mutually complimentary 
language, Korabelnikov did not allow the opportunity to make a point go unused.  
The General noted that GRU was capable of meeting “the most modern 
requirements of today,” and that the agency was “able to operate in all currently 
known areas of intelligence activities.” (4) This vein of commentary continued in 
an interview with ITAR-TASS, during which the GRU Chief insisted that military 
intelligence occupies “an important place” in the country’s intelligence apparat. 
Korabelnikov noted that there are a number of tasks that still must be carried out 
by the GRU, including “monitoring of US plans to deploy missile defense in 
Eastern Europe, which the top military-political leadership believes poses a threat 
to the country’s national security.” (5) GRU, according to its Chief, also would 
maintain its focus on anti-narcotics (a field that, until now, has not seemed to fall 
under GRU control), as well as anti-terrorism, particularly on the mission of 
hunting down terrorist leaders. (6) Korabelnikov’s comments clearly were aimed 
both at Putin and the FSB, warning them that while they may have successfully 
subsumed and taken over other agencies, GRU is (apparently) having 
successes—and is off limits.  
 
Back to the USSR: No jokes!  
Late in October, Communist Party campaigners mounted an election campaign 
in Novosibirsk.  Part of the campaign consisted of 11,200 party pamphlets and 
newspapers being distributed via letterboxes. The pamphlets allegedly contained 
criticisms of other political parties, including United Russia and President Putin. 
One joke claimed that “Pushkin is our everything, Tsereteli is our everywhere and 
Putin is our forever.” Given that Zurab Tsereteli (a sculptor, and administrative 
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head of the Russian Academy of the Arts) is “much despised,” (7) this reference 
to Putin was apparently not a complimentary one.  
    
As soon as the pamphlets appeared, the local FSB took action. Sergei 
Sharmanov, Chief of the regional FSB’s Department for the Protection of the 
Constitutional Order, filed a complaint with the election commission, noting that 
“the articles in the newspaper were entirely devoted to compromising material 
against the political parties LDPR, Just Russia and One Russia.” Moreover, 
“They publish ‘Jokes from Zyuganov,’ in which One Russia, Just Russia and RF 
President Putin are spoken of in inappropriate terms.” (8) Sharmanov demanded 
that such “illegal” campaigning be stopped. (9) 
    
Although the election commission examined the pamphlets, it denied 
Sharmanov’s request, stating that no violations of electoral law had been found.  
The Communist Party has refused to withdraw the leaflets and newspapers, and 
has vowed to continue their distribution. (10) Indeed, the Party’s lawyer, Vadim 
Solovyov, claimed that the FSB’s complaint betrayed a “misunderstanding of 
many aspects of election laws.” (11)  
    
This response must be seen as naïve at best. The term “misunderstanding” 
implies a mistake. While these events may have been local, rather than national, 
in that Sharmanov’s actions may not have been ordered from Moscow, this 
incident is not a first. 
 
That the Election Commission upheld the Communist’s viewpoint is essentially 
irrelevant: Zyuganov does not represent a threat to President Putin. But “the fact 
that…special services are reacting to political jokes is just as revealing as the 
fact that they appear.” (12) What is worrisome, is that this incident hearkens back 





On 31 October, a bomb exploded on a passenger bus in Togliatti (Samara 
Region), killing eight persons and injuring at least 50 others. (13) Investigators at 
the scene established that the explosion was equivalent to 2kg of TNT. 
Authorities were quick to announce that the blast may have been the work of a 
suicide bomber, and, therefore, that terrorism could not be ruled out. (14) 
Izvestiya has alleged that “fragments of a suicide bomber’s belt” were found 
inside the bus, while survivors of the blast apparently recall a “heavy set woman” 
with shopping bags boarding the bus shortly before the explosion. (15)  
    
Apparently, the investigation—which lasted less than two days—was a massive 
success. On 2 November, FSB Director Patrushev claimed that his agency had 
“established” the “person who was most likely involved in the explosion.” (16)  
    
Authorities have, not surprisingly, linked the explosion to Chechen terrorists – 
specifically to Dokka Umarov, claiming that information was received weeks ago, 
indicating that he was planning a major operation. (17) But, the Chechen 
connection is not the only plausible explanation. Togliatti long has been the 
center of a mafia struggle for control of Russia’s automobile production. As such, 
a mob war cannot be ruled out entirely. (18)  
    
Politically speaking, it is in President Putin’s, and the FSB’s interest to link yet 
another bombing (like the Moscow-St.Petersburg incident) to Chechnya, and to 
produce a culprit as soon as possible to bolster the case – and to show how 
“tough on terror” the administration is.  The fact that the “investigation” into this 
bombing (apparently) lasted less than two days, and that any perpetrators, other 
than “Chechen rebels” are being ignored, speaks to this motivation. 
 
Litvinenko update: Lugovoi alleges suicide 
Several weeks ago, British authorities made what appeared to be a conciliatory 
move in the Litvinenko case. Rather than filing a new extradition request for 
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Andrei Lugovoi, the Crown Prosecution asked that Prosecutor General Yuri 
Chaika’s office take “more investigative” action in the case and aid in securing 
the evidence that would prove Lugovoi’s involvement. (19) 
 
Chaika’s response to the British request was to give a new list of reasons why 
Russian authorities would not comply, while Lugovoi insisted that the British 
request amounted to little more than a provocation. 
 
In the last two weeks, Lugovoi again has gone public with a series of comments 
to the press. Lugovoi has used the press attention to spin a whole new theory 
regarding Alexandr Litvinenko’s murder: Lugovoi now claims that Litvinenko may 
have killed himself. Lugovoi claimed that, acting on behalf of MI6, Litvinenko was 
“dabbling” in the nuclear black market, and that he may have ingested some 
Polonium-210 in an “unfortunate accident.” Lugovoi also alleged that the 
Polonium found in Litvinenko’s bloodstream was British, not Russian in origin. 
(20) 
    
Lugovoi’s new claims are imaginative, to say the least. British weapons scientists 
at Aldermaston last December traced to Russia the Polonium used to kill 
Litvinenko. (21) Moreover, given his status as a defector, it was to be expected 
that Litvinenko was still working for the Secret Intelligence Service in some 
capacity, at least.  
    
MI6 probably is investigating nuclear black markets as part of the effort to 
counter the proliferation of fissile materiel. However, it is highly unlikely that a 
defector of Litvinenko’s value would have been permitted to participate in such 
operations.  
    
Lugovoi is running for the Duma, albeit for the LDP, under Vladimir Zhirinovsky. If 
he obtains a seat, he will have parliamentary immunity. If the LDP does not 
obtain seats, Lugovoi may simply be appointed to the Duma by the President. 
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Putin and Prosecutor General Chaika have stated repeatedly that there will be no 
extradition.  Lugovoi apparently has little to fear in terms of prosecution. Why 
then, is he being so vocal? Perhaps, the alleged assassin now fears for his own 
safety in Russia, and is seeking to bolster his status by pouring as much scorn as 
possible on the British case against him. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russian Military Intelligence Head Thanks Putin for Recognition,” Zvezda 
TV, Moscow, in Russian, 2 Nov 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) “Soviet Agent’s Medal To Go To Russian Military Intel Museum,” Industry 
Watch Daily News Bulletin, 2 Nov 07 via 
www.industrywatch.com/pages/iw2/Story.nsp?story_ 
id=111778845&ID=iw&scategory=Aerospace&P=&F=&R=&VNC=hnall 
(3) “Russian Military Intelligence Head Thanks Putin for Recognition,” Zvezda 
TV, Moscow, in Russian, 2 Nov 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) “Military Intelligence Has ‘Important Place in Russia’s System of National 
Intelligence and Military Security,” ITAR-TASS, 3 Nov 07; OSC Transcribed Text 
via World News Connection. 
(6) “Monitoring US ABM Efforts A Priority for Russian Military Intelligence—
General,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 3 Nov 07; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis 
(7) “FSB Not Amused By Communists,” The Moscow Times, 2 Nov 07 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(8) “Russian Security Officer Tries To Prosecute ‘Political Jokes,’ Gazeta.ru 
Website, Moscow, in Russian, 1 Nov 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) “Russian Communists Vow To Continue With Putin Jokes Despite FSB 
Interest,” Gazeta.ru, Moscow, in Russian, 1 Nov 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis. 
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(11) “FSB Not Amused By Communists,” The Moscow Times, 2 Nov 07 via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) “Russian Security Officer Tries To Prosecute ‘Political Jokes,’ Gazeta.ru 
Website, Moscow, in Russian, 1 Nov 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) “Eight People Killed in Russia Bus Blast,” BBC News, 31 Oct 07 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7070572.stm  
(14) “Russia: Security Official Does Not Rule Out Suicide Bomber in Togliatti Bus 
Blast,” ITAR-TASS, 31 Oct 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(15) “Federal Investigations Committee, FSB Bomb Specialists in Togliatti To 
Investigate Bus Blast,” Izvestiya (Moscow Edition), 1 Nov 07; OSC Translated 
Text via World News Connection. 
(16) “FSB Head Confirms Establishment Of Suspected Togliatti Bomber,” Interfax 
2 Nov 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(17) “Officials Seek Caucasian Trail in Togliatti Bombing,” Chechnya Weekly, 
Volume 8, Issue 42, 1 Nov 07 via 
www.jamestown.org/chechnya_weekly/article.php?articleid=2373761  
(18) “Eight Killed By Bus Bomb in Russia As Mafia Ceasefire Breaks Down,” The 
Daily Telegraph, 1 Nov 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(19) “Litvinenko May Have Killed Himself, Says Russian Accused of His Murder,” 
The Times of London, 2 Nov 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(20) “Lugovoi Claims He is ‘Victim of Nuclear Terrorism,’ Interfax, 1 Nov 07; OSC 
Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(21) “Radioactivity Found in Litvinenko’s Italian Contact,” Bloomberg Update, 1 




Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Carol Northrup 
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Will Russia abandon CFE? 
On 6 November all 418 lawmakers present at the State Duma (the lower house 
of the Russian parliament) voted unanimously to suspend participation in the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).  The vote must be 
approved by the upper house and signed by President Putin—both are expected.  
The recent vote amounts to legislative confirmation of the suspension plan 
announced last July by President Vladimir Putin in response to the United States’ 
continuing plans to install a missile defense system in Central Europe.  Despite 
repeated assurances from Washington that the system is designed as a defense 
against rogue states like Korea and especially Iran, the Kremlin maintains that 
the planned system is a threat to Russian national security and has vowed to 
respond accordingly. 
 
Negotiated and signed at the end of the Cold War, the CFE treaty is widely 
considered to be the cornerstone of European security.  Originally signed in 
November 1990, the treaty set limits on the number of tanks, armored combat 
vehicles (ACV), heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters that NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural 
Mountains.  Initially designed to prevent either alliance from concentrating forces 
for launching blitzkrieg-type offensives, the treaty uses a system of “concentric 
zones” mandating smaller deployments of tanks, ACV and artillery the closer one 
moves to the center of Europe. (1)  
 
When the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact changed the military equation in Europe, CFE parties overhauled 
the treaty at the November 1999 summit of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, meeting in Istanbul.  Along with other updates, the 
Adapted CFE replaced bloc and zone limits with national and territorial arms 
ceilings. (2)  At Russia’s request, it allowed a limited expansion of Russian forces 
in the northern and southern “flanks” (facing the Baltic states and Georgia-
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Azerbaijan, respectively). Although the adapted treaty has been signed, it has not 
yet been ratified by NATO signatories and therefore has not entered into force.  
 
NATO claims that Russia has not fulfilled commitments made at Istanbul, and 
NATO countries have refused to ratify the treaty until Russia honors these 
commitments.  At issue is the presence of Russian forces in so-called “frozen 
conflict” zones in Georgia and Moldova. (3)  The US acknowledges that progress 
has been made in Georgia, where Russia has withdrawn or committed to 
withdraw most of its troops.  However, a substantial Russian presence remains 
at a facility in the disputed Abkhazia region and withdrawals of Russian troops 
from Moldova have been stalled since 2004.  (4)  Russian refusal to move on 
these two issues remains a major obstacle to NATO ratification.    
 
Russia’s claim is that it has completely fulfilled all commitments related to the 
adapted CFE treaty.  The Kremlin says troops in Georgia and Moldova are 
serving as peacekeepers in those two countries (5) and that their troop 
withdrawals to date satisfy the Istanbul commitments.  (6) Russia also has 
expressed concern that it believes NATO far exceeds the limits of the current 
treaty, (7) and over the “rapid growth in armament” of the Baltic states that does 
not currently fall under CFE restrictions. (8)  Moscow says it cannot live under the 
conditions of the old treaty, which no longer protects Russia’s security interests 
(9) and cannot abide by the adapted treaty until it is ratified by other CFE 
signatories.  Consequently, unless western partners begin to take Russia’s 
concerns more seriously and fulfill their commitments, Russia plans to suspend 
participation in the treaty effective 12 December. (10) 
 
The CFE treaty so far has led to elimination of more than 60,000 pieces of 
conventional weaponry from Europe, (11) but it is the openness and 
transparency regarding the major armies of Europe that have been the real boon 
to European security.  The requirement for all parties to allow frequent 
inspections has reduced significantly the suspicion and distrust between states 
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that can lead to a dangerous arms race.  Though it is possible that collapse of 
the CFE treaty could lead to a renewed arms race, that is not a likely scenario.  
Russian military industries cannot keep up with currently planned production (see 
The ISCIP Analyst, Vol XIV, 1 November) and are not capable of producing the 
large quantities of weapons required to engage in a bona fide arms race.  
However, the current regime of inspections, advance warnings and 
announcements that fosters transparency and trust—and leads to greater 
European security—would no longer exist. 
 
Collapse of the CFE regime, however, is not necessarily imminent.  Numerous 
press releases and comments by Russian officials indicate that the Kremlin 
realizes that it is not in Russia’s best interest to withdraw from the treaty.  Viktor 
Zavarzin, head of the Duma Defense Committee said that Russia’s decision to 
suspend participation “is a signal to the West, but it does not mean the return to 
confrontation,” and that the Duma is ready to resume discussions with the West 
at any moment. (12)  Deputy Foreign Defense Minister Sergei Kislyak 
emphasized that Russia is “…not aiming to cause damage to arms control…” 
(13)  Though the Defense Ministry announced that it does not rule out the 
possibility of reinforcing units in the western sector, Deputy Defense Minister 
Colonel General Kolmakov took care to emphasize that no specific plans or 
decisions toward that end have been made. (14) 
 
In all likelihood, Russia does not intend to abandon CFE for good.  As a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, Moscow’s cooperation is an 
important factor in several areas of major significance to the United States – the 
foremost of which is a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.  Russia is quite 
aware of this fact and has indicated it is willing to move somewhat on this and 
other issues but not without some serious quid pro quo (15).  By continuing down 
the road toward suspension of the CFE treaty, Russia is once again signaling 
that it expects to be taken seriously as a power player in international affairs and 
that it intends to do so on its own terms. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Melissa McGann 
 
The future of Russian-EU partnership undecided 
On 26 October, President Vladimir Putin attended the 20th EU-Russia summit 
held in Mafra, Portugal, the final summit before Russian presidential elections 
this spring. It was reported that the aims of the Portuguese summit were to 
address energy and economic disputes, the future EU-Russian partnership and 
the international issues in Kosovo and Iran. (1) Russian ambassador to the 
European Union Vladimir Chizhov claimed that no historic breakthroughs were 
expected, though he stated that the, “summit will carry out a strategic overview of 
Russia-EU relations and set ways for their future development.” (2) Portuguese 
Prime Minister, Jose Socrates, who currently holds the EU presidency, reported 
that “important” advances were made at the summit. (3) 
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EU-Russia relations are based on the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, which expires on 1 December 2007. Under this partnership 
agreement, Russia has become the EU’s third biggest trading partner, after the 
United States and China. (4) EU-Russian relations have evolved around a strong 
economic partnership, though Russia’s bilateral disputes with specific EU 
member states might have a negative impact on the balance of the partnership. 
(5) In retaliation (in part) for a 2005 Russian ban on Polish meat and plant 
imports based on alleged concerns over sanitary standards, Poland has vetoed 
negotiations for a new EU-Russian partnership agreement. (6) The continued 
strain on Polish-Russian relations has resulted in a roadblock in determining the 
future direction of the broader EU-Russian relationship. The stalled decision to 
renew the EU-Russia partnership agreement was not resolved at the recent 
summit and the 1997 partnership agreement will be extended one year until a 
consensus is reached among the EU member states.  
 
The primary agenda item at the EU-Russia summit was the issue of energy 
supplies and Russian energy companies’ access to European markets. (7)  The 
EU Commission has announced a new proposal that limits non-EU companies 
from “owning a majority share in gas pipelines or electricity power grids, unless 
their home country signs a reciprocal agreement with the EU.” (8) Moscow has 
claimed that the new EU draft energy guidelines are protectionist, and would 
require that Gazprom choose either the supply or distribution of gas. (9) EU 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson reportedly criticized the fact that energy 
has become politicized and reiterated that the unbundling of the EU energy 
market was to improve the EU’s internal energy market, but that it was not 
intended to discriminate against Russia. (10) Although a decision on the EU 
proposal is still under review, Vladimir Chizhov asserted, “no matter how you look 
at it, the proposal does not comply with market principles.” (11) 
 
On a more constructive note regarding the EU-Russia energy discussions, 
Vladimir Chizhov proposed an alert mechanism that would warn Europe in 
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advance if Moscow needed to cut off the gas supply to Europe in the case of a 
crisis. (12) This proposal should be viewed in the light of the 2005 crisis, in which 
Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and Belarus, leading to gas shortages 
across Europe. (13) The offer made by Chizhov and reiterated by President Putin 
appears designed to send a message to Europe that Russia will be a reliable 
energy partner. 
 
Another item on the agenda at the EU-Russia summit was Russia’s bid to 
become a member of the WTO. It was reported that prior to the Portuguese 
summit, Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov made a request to US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment, “a Soviet-era piece 
of legislation,” which has been an obstacle in Russia’s bid to join the WTO. (14) 
During the summit, the EU reported that it would support Russia’s bid for 
membership in the WTO, which has often been an issue in relations between 
Moscow and Brussels. (15) However, there have been reports that Poland would 
block Russia’s bid for membership, if Russia does not lift the ban on Polish meat 
and plant products. (16) Russia’s WTO negotiator, Maksim Medvedkov, 
expressed hope that Russia will join the WTO by the end of the year, although he 
noted that there are still a number of outstanding disputes regarding Polish meat 
and Russian timber exports that could further delay membership negotiations. 
(17) 
 
Overall, the Portuguese summit reportedly produced minor increases in 
cooperation between the EU and Russia. Agreements were proposed relating to 
visa travel arrangements and an early energy interruption warning mechanism, 
cooperation in drug trafficking and boosting trade in steel. (18)  Despite these 
achievements, no consensus was reached regarding the future of the EU-Russia 
strategic partnership or on any number of mounting international issues. The 
future EU-Russia relationship still is to be determined, though Joschka Fischer 




Theme years lead to strengthened Russian-Chinese Partnership  
On 6 November, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
Zubkov met in Moscow in order to further bilateral cooperation in a variety of 
fields ranging from politics, trade and energy to science, technology and finance. 
(20) The meeting resulted in nine agreements to strengthen cooperation, four of 
which address the future cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear power and 
on construction completion of an oil pipeline connecting Russia and China by the 
end of 2008. (21) The two countries placed strong emphasis on mutual 
understanding and more coordination in global affairs as the basis for enriched 
future cooperation between them. Based on the five meetings President Hu 
Jintao and President Vladimir Putin have held this year, it appears as if closer 
relations with China certainly appear to be a priority in Russian foreign policy. 
(22) 
 
In 2006, China held the “Year of Russia,” and consequently 2007 is the “Year of 
China” in Russia. Significantly, China has become Russia’s third largest trade 
partner. (23) In the beginning of 2007, Russia and China signed 21 contracts to 
expand trade between the two countries and so far this year, bilateral trade has 
reached 34.9 billion dollars. (24) The goal for trade between the two countries in 
2010 is set at 80 billion US dollars. Russia and China reportedly have agreed to 
20 joint-economic projects, including energy, investment, finance, 
communication, and transportation. (25) The “national years” celebrations are 
said to have increased cooperation between the two countries on a variety of 
levels and significantly contributed to the success of the partnership. (26) 
 
Although the Russian-Chinese partnership is expanding rapidly, Russia recently 
has closed its doors to low-cost Chinese carmakers. From January to June 2007, 
China exported 38,600 cars to Russia, six times as many as in 2006. (27) The 
recent decision by Moscow to restrict the import of Chinese cars reportedly is 
motivated by a fear that Chinese carmakers would compete successfully with 
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domestic automakers. (28) This decision might dampen the prosperous 
relationship that has developed between the two countries as China looks to 
other markets for its car export needs. 
 
Nearing the close of the “national years,” the meeting between the two premiers 
heralded the fruitful cooperation between the two countries. In reports following 
the recent meetings in Moscow, it appears that in addition to strong economic 
cooperation between the two countries, the partnership will attempt to extend to 
cover international issues. (29) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) RIA Novosti, “20th EU-Russia Summit Winds Up in Portugal,” 26 Oct 07 via 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20071026/85642667.html.   
(2) RIA Novosti, in Russian 24 Oct 07, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, “No 
Historic Breakthroughs Expected at Russia-EU Summit – Senior Diplomat,” 24 
Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) The Moscow Times, “Putin Snipes at EU on Assess to Assets,” 29 Oct 07 via 
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(4) Ibid.  
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Nexis.  
(7) BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 24 Oct 07.    
(8) The International Herald Tribune, Dan Bilefsky, “Russia set to Avert EU Gas 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Déjà vu in Belarus? 
With the most recent Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute at least temporarily 
resolved—RosUkrEnergo reportedly received its last payment of $729 million 
from UkrGazEnergo on October 31, one day before the deadline agreed upon 
during negotiations earlier in October (1)—attention now has shifted to Belarus, 
another of Russia’s western neighbors and another major transit country for oil 
and gas flowing to countries of the European Union. According to Gazeta.Ru’s 
Aleksey Topalov, the two are related: “Yulia Tymoshenko coming to power in 
Ukraine may change Russo-Ukrainian relations,” he writes, “and Belarus wants 
to position itself as a reliable partner” (2)—“reliable” presumably being in contrast 
to the volatile Tymoshenko and her similarly volatile country. Belarus’ first moves, 
however, do not exactly present that image - as Topalov writes next, “once again, 
everything started with blackmail.” (3) While who is blackmailing whom may in 
this case be a matter of dispute, it seems evident that relations with Russia’s 
authoritarian neighbor are not destined to be as smooth and easy as Gazprom’s 
leadership might have hoped. 
 
On Thursday, November 8, Gazprom chairman Aleksei Miller met with the first 
deputy of the Belarusian prime minister, Vladimir Semashko. According to 
Gazprom’s official statement, the existing Russo-Belarusian contract dealing with 
the sale and transit of gas between 2007 and 2011, signed on December 31, 
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2006, was confirmed during the course of this meeting. (4) The terms of that 
contract stipulate that the price of gas sold to Belarus is to increase steadily over 
this period, from about 67% of the average European rate as it currently stands, 
to 100% of that rate by 2011, with incremental price increases every new year. 
(5) A few days after that meeting, however, the Belarusian transit company 
Gomeltransneft Druzhba (Friendship) released a statement that appears to be in 
contradiction to Gazprom’s assertion that both sides have committed themselves 
completely to fulfilling all terms of the contract. The Belarussian statement, 
published on the state Internet portal “Telegraph,” suggests that as of next year, 
due to the increase in Russian gas prices, Belarus may raise the tariff on the 
transit of Russian petroleum through Belarusian territory. (6) It did not specify the 
amount by which the tariff may increase or the date when the increase may go 
into effect, but rather stated more generally that it will depend on the amount by 
which the price of Russian gas increases. (7)  
 
In light of the recent meeting with Gazprom and what has allegedly come out of 
it, that statement is rather strange. What exactly does the management of 
Gomeltransneft mean when it says that it will increase tariffs based on the 
increase in Russian gas prices when, according to the contract that apparently 
had just been confirmed by both sides, that amount has been fixed and agreed 
upon as of the beginning of this year? The only logical conclusion seems to be 
that the Belarusian side now is backing away from committing to its end of the 
bargain; in other words, it is refusing to view the price increases as stipulated in 
the contract as final. But if, as Topalov says, Belarus currently is interested in 
taking advantage of the political changes in Ukraine in order to present itself as 
the reliable partner (unlike Ukraine) in terms of energy transit, what purpose 
would such a statement serve? If anything, it seems to present the opposite 
image. It is perhaps true that Belarus wishes to take advantage of a rift in Russo-
Ukrainian relations as a result of the likely future prime ministry of Yulia 
Tymoshenko with her pro-Western stance, but the resounding message from its 
 28 
most recent statement is more along the lines of “further cooperation with us is 
going to cost you” rather than “you can depend on us.” 
 
One can easily understand, however, (and even sympathize with) the Belarusian 
viewpoint in this situation. In purely economic terms, it makes sense for Belarus 
to attempt to avoid a net financial loss and to compensate for price increases by 
raising transit tariffs (even though it should be remembered that the price 
increases are in reality reductions in what amounts to a massive Russian subsidy 
as a result of the sale of gas for many years at below-market value). In more 
general terms, Belarus’ position vis-à-vis Russia is not enviable. Lukashenko is 
probably more dependent on Russia than any other country’s leader, but, given 
the nature of his administration, Lukashenko cannot expect Western support in 
his dealings with Russia on this issue. Given such a precarious position, it is only 
natural that he should try to maintain as much independence as possible, and get 
as much economic benefit as Russia is willing to tolerate, while ensuring 
continued Russian support against a scenario similar to Ukraine’s Orange 
Revolution unfolding in Belarus. It is questionable, however, whether haggling 
and whatever benefits Belarus may gain in the negotiations would be worth the 
additional frustration it causes Russia. On one hand, Belarus’s geographic 
location between Russia and Europe remains critically important for gas transit 
and may become even more so with the changing political climate in Ukraine; on 
the other hand, if Gazprom continues to wield significant power, eventually it may 
circumvent Belarus. Indeed, the future of Russia’s energy relations with Ukraine 
under a Tymoshenko premiership should serve as a good indicator of the 
magnitude of the effect that internal political change in neighboring states will 
have on Russia’s ability to exert international leverage through its resources. If 
even a democratic and Western-oriented Ukraine remains as dependent upon 
Russian oil and gas as it has been in the past, then Lukashenko has a lot to 
worry about in the next few years.  
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This recent Belarusian threat to raise tariffs on the transit of Russian crude is 
strongly reminiscent of an earlier Russo-Belarusian energy dispute that took 
place late in 2006 and continued until into 2007. (See previous ISCIP Analyst, 
Foreign Policy, Vol. XIII, No. 6.) Then, as now, Belarus threatened—and for a 
time carried out the threat—to make Russia pay extra for transporting oil through 
the “Friendship Pipeline” on its territory in response to gas price increases. In 
response, Gazprom temporarily shut down the pipeline, creating enough of a 
panic in the countries of the European Union for Angela Merkel to rush to 
Moscow in an effort to resolve the situation. (8) While Gazprom thus far has 
refrained from overt threats of a repeat performance, the possibility is never far 
away. Additionally, one cannot help but notice the timing of these “energy wars” 
that coincide with the approach of winter, in this year as in last. Gazprom’s 
practice of raising energy prices at the beginning of each year is probably more 
than merely a matter of convenience in terms of the calendar, while the tendency 
of transit countries of to raise the alarm as the cold approaches is likely no 
coincidence either. Perhaps, as with the case of the polar ice cap, only global 
warming will provoke a significant change; until then, one can expect these 
energy battles to continue. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Ukraina dala deneg na gazovuyu vojnu (Ukraine paid for gas war),” Galina 
Shakirova, Gazeta.Ru, 31 Oct 07via 
http://gazeta.ru/business/2007/10/31/2279365.shtml. 
(2) “Belorussia vytorgovavaet sebe gaz (Belarus haggles over gas),” Aleksey 
Topalov, Gazeta.Ru, 09 Nov 07via 
http://gazeta.ru/business/2007/11/09/2299808.shtml. 
(3) Ibid.  
(4) “Russia and Belarus confirm conditions of gas contract,” RIA Novosti, 08 Nov 
07 via http://rian.ru/economy/20071108/87236716.html. 
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(5) “Belorussia vytorgovavaet sebe gaz (Belarus haggles over gas),” Aleksey 
Topalov, Gazeta.Ru, 09 Nov 07via 
http://gazeta.ru/business/2007/11/09/2299808.shtml. 
(6) Ibid.  
(7) Ibid.  
(8) See the ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 6 (25 Jan 07): “A change of 
course in energy?” by Alexey Dynkin. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
Georgia in turmoil—protests, state of emergency and snap elections 
Background  
The arrest of former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili on corruption charges, 
just after announcing the formation of his opposition party, proved a catalyst for 
unifying Georgia’s main opposition groups, however fleeting that unity may prove 
to be. (1) Okruashvili was released after publicly denouncing the charges he had 
made against President Mikheil Saakashvili and paying an exorbitant fine. 
Although opposition groups claimed that Okruashvili had been drugged, he has 
since announced that Georgian officials exerted extreme psychological pressure 
on him in order to produce the retraction. Okruashvili flew to Munich, ostensibly 
for medical care, the day before opposition groups staged mass protests in Tbilisi 
on 2 November. It is not clear yet whether he left Georgia willingly or was 
removed forcibly by authorities in order to prevent his participation in the 
protests. He made a televised speech to the protesters as they gathered in 
Tbilisi. Okruashvili’s trial is set for 16 November in Tbilisi city court. (2) 
 
Preparations for protests were underway throughout October as opposition 
groups staged smaller demonstrations in Georgia’s regions. The 2 November 
 31 
protests were held on the fourth anniversary of the day when Saakashvili 
launched his own protests against former President Eduard Shevardnadze, 
following parliamentary elections. The fractious opposition, which united following 
Okruashvili’s arrest in September, initially called for early parliamentary elections 
and then graduated their demands to include Saakashvili’s resignation. 
 
Both presidential and parliamentary elections were rescheduled for fall 2008, 
after tensions with Russia heightened over Georgia’s expulsion of alleged 
Russian spies in September 2006. Parliament’s mandate was scheduled to 
expire in spring 2008, while Saakashvili’s presidential term was not officially over 
until 2009. Both terms were adjusted and simultaneous elections were 
scheduled. Saakashvili and the ruling National Movement party claimed the 
rescheduling had to do with national security. With Russian presidential elections 
slated for March 2008, it seemed that Georgian officials wanted to avoid being 
the victim of Russian manipulation as part of a domestic Russian political 
stratagem. During the transition from Yel’tsin to Putin, the Russian invasion of 
Chechnya played a crucial role in Russian politics and also demonstrated to 
Georgia how “small wars” can be made to yield big political dividends. 
Additionally, Saakashvili may have feared contesting an election without the 
momentum of the National Movement behind him in parliamentary contests. 
 
Protests and state of emergency 
The opposition protests drew tens of thousands of Georgians to Tbilisi and lasted 
for five days before they were squelched by riot police. The number of protesters 
had dwindled to several dozen, according to Saakashvili, (3) and police were 
attempting to clear a traffic route across Rustaveli Avenue. By Saakashvili’s 
account, the protesters resisted the riot police, who left the area and then 
returned with rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons. By that time, the 
protesters had called for another demonstration, which was quelled by the police; 
the police confiscated cameras from journalists, apparently to minimize negative 
media coverage. Sozar Subari was beaten during the police action, even after he 
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identified himself as Georgia’s human rights ombudsman. (4) That same day, the 
government closed down the Imedi and Kavkasia television stations. Imedi is 
partially owned by oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili and had strongly supported the 
opposition groups and protests.  
 
On 7 November, Georgian officials announced that there had been an attempted 
coup against the Georgian government. They also accused members of the 
opposition parties of collaborating with Russia to destabilize Georgia. Georgia 
recalled its ambassador to Russia and the two countries exchanged diplomatic 
expulsions. The Georgian government aired a video that claimed to show 
opposition members holding talks with Russian secret services as evidence of 
the alleged espionage. The opposition members accused of espionage and 
called in for questioning were Shalva Natelashvili, Tsotne Gamsakhurdia, 
parliamentarian Levan Berdzenishvili, and Giorgi Khaindrava. Badri 
Patarkatsishvili was added to the list later. Okruashvili has denied allegations that 
Russia is behind the opposition protests. (5) 
 
Following the crackdown, Saakashvili declared a state of emergency in Tbilisi. In 
the early morning hours of 8 November, Economics Minister Giorgi Arveladze 
announced that Saakashvili had extended the state of emergency to all of 
Georgia for a period of 15 days, subject to confirmation by the parliament. Under 
the state of emergency, the government has imposed restrictions on the right to 
disseminate information, the right to assemble, and the right to strike. (6) Only 
the Georgian Public Broadcasting station is allowed to broadcast during the state 
of emergency. 
 
Opposition and espionage? 
The opposition members accused of spying have rather diverse backgrounds. 
Shalva Natelashvili is the leader of the Labor Party, which has been labeled as 
pro-Russian by Saakashvili’s administration. Natelashvili has been very critical of 
Georgia’s relationship with US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew 
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Bryza, whom Natelashvili labeled the “Gray Cardinal” of Georgian affairs in July 
2005. (7)  Bryza has played a significant role in the US-Georgia relationship; he 
was immediately dispatched by the United States to Tbilisi, following the 
declaration of a state of emergency. 
 
Tsotne Gamsakhurdia is the oldest son by the second wife of independent 
Georgia’s first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. His half-brother (by Zviad’s first 
wife), Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, is head of the Freedom Party. Tsotne 
Gamsakhurdia has a somewhat checkered past. He was kidnapped briefly (for 
less than a day) in 1997 in Chechnya during Aslan Maskhadov’s presidency of 
the rebel republic. (8) In 1999, he was involved in a shooting in Tbilisi; he fled to 
Adjaria to avoid prosecution. (9) In 2007, Gamsakhurdia participated in a 
Russian-organized trip to Chechnya to bring his father’s remains back to 
Georgia. Konstantine Gamsakhurdia was among the leaders of the opposition 
who traveled to Washington, DC in late September to meet with US officials, one 
of whom was Matthew Bryza. (10) 
 
Levan Berdzenishvili, also accused of spying, has been a vocal critic of 
Saakashvili. Following the Rose Revolution, he became a member of the 
parliamentary majority, but left in June 2004, along with three other Republican 
Party members, over how the situation with Adjaria and its former leader Aslan 
Abashidze was handled. (11) Berdzenishvili was involved in numerous civil 
society groups before entering politics. 
 
Giorgi Khaindrava, one of the most vocal and visible leaders of these opposition 
protests, also was accused by Saakashvili’s government of espionage. 
Khaindrava, now of the Equality Institute, was formerly the State Minister for 
Conflict Resolution Issues. He was replaced by Deputy Foreign Minister Merab 
Antadze in July 2006, in part because he criticized actions taken by then Defense 
Minister Irakli Okruashvili. (12) Khaindrava labeled Saakashvili’s National 
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Movement party a “terrorist organization” after protesters in Zugdidi clashed with 
police in late October. (13) 
 
Badri Patarkatsishvili—the well-known Georgian business magnate, part owner 
of the Imedi television station, and associate of exiled Russian oligarch Boris 
Berezovsky—has been closely linked by authorities with the opposition groups. 
Attention shifted to Patarkatsishvili as the primary opposition figure after 
Okruashvili’s release and subsequent declaration that he would not enter politics. 
Patarkatsishvili publicly offered to fund opposition groups in late October. All of 
them accepted his support, except for the Labor Party. (14) Since the imposition 
of the state of emergency and espionage accusations, Patarkatsishvili has left 
Georgia and reportedly is in England. Perhaps fearing government actions 
against him, Patarkatsishvili sold a portion of his holdings in Imedi to Rupert 
Murdoch in late October. 
 
The road ahead 
After having called a state of emergency and accused opposition members of 
collaboration with Russia, by 8 November Saakashvili announced his decision to 
hold presidential elections on 5 January 2008 and, at the same time, to conduct a 
referendum establishing when elections for a new parliament would be held. 
According to the constitution, Saakashvili must step down 45 days prior to the 
date of elections, 22 November in this case, and the speaker of the parliament 
will assume the position of interim president. That honor once again will go to 
Nino Burdjanadze, who also functioned as the caretaker of the presidency after 
Eduard Shevardnadze resigned. On 9 November, parliament, led by 
Burdjanadze, confirmed Saakashvili’s declaration of emergency rule. 
 
Nino Burdjanadze is a key player in talks between the government and the 
opposition groups; the talks resumed on 10 November for the first time since the 
protests began. Discussions are underway between the government and five of 
the opposition groups—Georgia’s Way, the Conservative Party, the Republican 
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Party, the New Rights Party, and the Industrialists. Sitting in for the government 
in the discussions are Burdjanadze, Vice-Speaker Mikheil Machavariani, 
parliamentarian Giga Bokeria, and Maia Nadiradze, the legislative majority 
leader. (15) 
 
With elections set for January, the contestants have begun to stake out the field. 
Patarkatsishvili announced on 10 November that he would run for president, but 
the opposition groups have not embraced him. Former Defense Minister Irakli 
Okruashvili is also out of the running because he will not meet the age 
requirement (35 years old) until November 2008, eleven months after the 
scheduled elections. Instead, the opposition has chosen its own presidential 
candidate—Levan Gachechiladze. Gachechiladze got his start as a 
businessman, founding Georgian Wine and Spirits in the 1990s. He entered 
parliament in 1999 as a member of Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union of Georgia, 
but left to create the New Rights Party. (16) Gachechiladze supported the Rose 
Revolution and even worked as Saakashvili’s campaign chief in 2004. 
Notwithstanding, he ran successfully as an independent in the 2004 legislative 
elections, rather than joining the dominant National Movement party. He 
subsequently fell out with Saakashvili over the proposed date for the 2008 
parliamentary elections and has played a vocal role in the growing opposition 
movement. (17) Gachechiladze’s candidacy is supported by Okruashvili’s 
Movement for United Georgia, the Republican Party, the Conservative Party, 
Georgia’s Way, the Freedom party, On Our Own, Party of the People, Georgian 
Troupe, and National Forum. (18) Gachechiladze’s prime minister, should he win 
the elections, will be Salome Zurabishvili, former foreign minister and leader of 
the Georgia’s Way party. 
 
The Labor Party has decided to front its own leader, Shalva Natelashvili, as its 
presidential contender. Due to the pending espionage charges against him, 
Natelashvili’s presidential bid was momentarily shaky. On 9 November, the 
General Prosecutor announced that Natelashvili was wanted on charges of 
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spying and plotting to overthrow the government. (19) That very day, the 
Georgian press reported that the German government was considering granting 
asylum to Shalva Natelashvili and his family. (20) He also was rumored to have 
been applying for asylum to the US. (21) However, on 10 November Saakashvili 
reversed the state’s course and announced that Natelashvili could run for 
president. 
 
In a possible signal that the situation in Tbilisi is stabilizing, Burdjanadze 
announced on 14 November that the state of emergency would be lifted on 16 
November. (22) However, the government’s continued actions against the Imedi 
television station, including the suspension of its broadcasting license and the 
freezing of its assets, (23) are worrisome reminders of the tension between 
democratic values and authoritarian implementation that plagues Saakashvili’s 
administration. 
 
Escalating tensions in Abkhazia 
As the crisis in Tbilisi continues to shake out, tensions are rising over Abkhazia, 
one of Georgia’s breakaway republics. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov recently has 
called on Russia to recognize Abkhazia officially, a move that Moscow has 
avoided to date despite consistent support for the separatist region. (24)  Adding 
oil to the fire, according to Davit Bakradze, the Georgian minister for conflict 
resolution issues, Russia has delivered five T-72 battle tanks, five GRAD-type 
multiple rocket launchers, five armored vehicles, and seven howitzers to 
Abkhazia. (25) Bakradze also claimed that Russia was sending Chechen 
warriors (Kadyrovtsy) to Abkhazia to serve as “peacekeepers.” This is in keeping 
with Georgian claims that Chechens formed part of the “peacekeeping” forces 
involved in the conflict at the Georgian patriotic youth camp that borders the 
Abkhazian Gali district in October. 
 
Not surprisingly, Russia has denied Bakradze’s claims and labeled Georgia’s 
statements a provocation. (26) With the closure of its Batumi base on 13 
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November, two days ahead of schedule, Russia’s primary military presence in 
Georgia is maintained through its role as “peacekeepers” in the separatist 
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
 
De facto Abkhaz President Sergei Bagapsh also has rejected the Georgian 
allegations. He did state, however, that Abkhazia is regrouping its troops in 
reaction to Georgia’s domestic crisis. (27) In return, Abkhaz officials have alleged 
that Georgia is gathering its reservists—mostly members of militia groups, 
according to the Abkhaz—on Abkhazia’s borders. (28) 
 
With its internal stability shaken and its territorial integrity continually under threat 
from neighboring powers, Georgia will tread a difficult and potentially unsteady 
path for the foreseeable future. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Zubkov visit to Uzbekistan produces small, but significant benefit 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov arrived in Tashkent for a two-day visit on 
November 1, in order to discuss a number of bilateral issues with President Islom 
Karimov and Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev ahead of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, which was held on November 2.  The 
focus of Zubkov’s visit seems to have been largely the same as former Prime 
Minister Fradkov’s visit to Uzbekistan last April: energy issues, the military 
industry (specifically, aircraft production at Tashkent’s Chkalov plant), uranium 
mining, and the facilitation of further Russian investment in the Uzbek economy.  
Zubkov also echoed Fradkov’s optimism regarding Russian-Uzbek relations, 
pointing out that trade between the two countries had increased by forty percent 
in 2006 alone and that “Our relations are increasingly developing and an active 
political dialogue between the presidents of our countries is under way.” (1)  
Although for the most part, Zubkov’s visit did not seem to achieve much more 
than a mutual outpouring of good will and laudatory statements, his trip did result 
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in the restoration of one small, but arguably crucial economic benefit for 
President Karimov and the local labor force. 
 
The meeting between Mirziyoev and Zubkov served as the occasion for the 
Uzbek prime minister to announce that the two countries had signed a new 
contract on aircraft production, under which Uzbekistan is to build 32 Il-type 
airplanes for Russia: 28 Il-114 (basic airliner) (2) aircraft, two Il-76 (military cargo 
planes) and two Il-78 (tanker planes) aircraft. (3)  This agreement appears to 
restore the contract that the Chkalov plant lost last spring, due to production 
delays.  The Uzbek side had agreed to build 38 Il aircraft for Russia, which would 
then be sold to China, but a dispute over production costs caused delays and 
Russia ultimately decided to reduce the Chkalov aviation plant’s share of the 
contract to only 15 aircraft and produce the rest itself.  At the time, Fradkov 
announced that Russia was considering moving production of all of its Il aircraft 
out of Uzbekistan and the Chkalov plant’s future looked dim.  However, the new 
contract seems to guarantee a new lease on life for the plant, at least for the 
short term and may have curried considerable favor with President Karimov.  The 
Chkalov plant provides employment for 80,000 people and is one of the largest 
aviation assembly factories in Central Asia; shutting it down or even dramatically 
reducing its workforce would have sent shockwaves through both Tashkent’s and 
Uzbekistan’s economies. (4)  At a time when the cost of living in Central Asia is 
increasing five times as fast (at least) as the average wage and when the price of 
a staple as basic as bread is straining the family budget, a significant rise in 
unemployment could set off widespread unrest on the eve of Uzbekistan’s 
presidential elections. 
 
Whatever other matters Zubkov discussed with his Uzbek hosts were 
summarized in the following brief, but vague press statement: “The parties 
discussed priority issues in bilateral cooperation and exchanged views on key 
international and regional problems of mutual interest.”  President Karimov 
commented that “Relations between the two countries will continue to develop,” 
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and emphasized the importance of his personal relationship with President Putin. 
(5) 
 
The main impetus for Zubkov’s Tashkent visit was clearly the SCO summit, 
where he stumped vigorously for the speedy establishment of an “energy club” in 
order to facilitate “cooperation” on energy-related issues among the 
organization’s six members (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan). (6)  The energy club concept is not a new one, having been 
broached by Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev and heartily seconded 
by President Putin at the SCO’s presidential summit in Bishkek last August.  
Nazarbaev proposed that a single energy market should be created under the 
auspices of the SCO that would include the drafting of a unified energy strategy, 
a database on energy cooperation and trade between SCO members, and an 
SCO energy exchange.  Putin expressed enthusiastic support for the idea: 
“Broader cooperation in the energy sector can give a powerful impetus to 
regional projects for the benefit of all SCO member-nations.  I am convinced that 
our ongoing energy dialogue, the integration of our national energy concepts and 
the creation of an energy club will help set out priorities for further cooperation.” 
(7)  However, to date, the SCO states, including Kazakhstan, still are discussing 
the issue; its Central Asian members no doubt are concerned that an SCO 
“energy market” dominated by Russia and China would deprive them of 
considerable autonomy in negotiating deals to further develop their own oil and 
gas resources, as well as their own pipeline routes. 
 
Competition between Russia and China over Central Asia’s energy resources 
and potential pipeline routes is becoming more heated, especially now that the 
Turkmen government is courting an ever increasing number of suitors to invest in 
and develop its still unconfirmed oil and gas largesse.  In this environment, even 
Uzbekistan suddenly has assumed considerable importance in the oil and gas 
market, largely due to its geographic position; the latest proposals for new 
pipeline and rail routes include Uzbek territory in the transit routes.  Uzbekistan 
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also claims to possess very large and, as yet, untapped natural gas fields, but 
thus far, no non-Uzbek company has been permitted to conduct an independent 
survey of these resources.  It is small wonder, then, that Zubkov’s renewed 
efforts to establish an SCO energy club met with little enthusiasm; it is in the 
other SCO states’ best interests to bide their time and negotiate individual energy 
deals.  By stalling the SCO, the Central Asian states already have gained some 
leverage over both Russia and China, leverage that may well increase in the 
coming months.  As much of President Karimov’s good will as Zubkov and his 
deputies may have obtained by offering a new contract to the Chkalov aviation 
plant, it remains to be seen whether the Russian government will offer enough 
other incentives to keep not only Uzbekistan, but also the rest of Central Asia, in 
its sphere of influence. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Ukraine’s politics descend into farce 
As of 15 November, over six weeks since its parliamentary elections, Ukraine 
remains without a government.  The country’s leaders, who have endured 
criticism in the past for their inability to complete important reforms, now risk 
being seen as ineffectual and bungling. 
 
In October, Ukraine President Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine-People’s Self-
Defense Bloc (OU-PSD) signed a parliamentary majority coalition agreement 
with former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s eponymous bloc (BYuT).  The 
agreement would give the two parties a slim three seat majority of 228 out of 450 
seats, and would allow them to name the future prime minister, who shares equal 
power with the president.   By virtue of BYuT’s larger vote base, Tymoshenko 
would become the prime minister. 
 
Soon after, various Ukrainian media outlets reported that three members of the 
president’s bloc had refused to sign the document, coincidentally reducing the 
coalition to one vote short of a majority.   The position of these newly elected 
deputies could make the creation of any coalition extremely difficult and 
undermines the progress made during the elections by former “orange” parties 
and blocs.  In the election, BYUT won over 30% of the vote (up from 23%), while 
OU-PSD won over 14% (up from 13%).    
 
Two of Yushchenko’s deputies provided a myriad of reasons why they hadn’t 
signed the coalition agreement – they were out of town, they were in town but 
never saw it, nobody discussed it with them, and finally, that they needed more 
clarification on various points. 
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Deputies Ihor Kril and Vasyl Petiovka are based in Transcarpathia (Zakarpatska), 
which is the last remaining OU-PSD stronghold in Ukraine (this is the only area 
where the bloc placed first in the election).   President Yushchenko’s Chief of 
Staff Viktor Baloha also hails from the Transcarpathian region and is known to be 
close to both Kril and Petiovka.  (1) 
 
The third man who has refused to sign the coalition agreement with BYuT is Ivan 
Plyushch, the head of the Yushchenko-led National Security and Defense 
Council. 
 
Plyushch was the speaker of Ukraine’s parliament when Yushchenko served as 
prime minister from 2000-2002 and was one of the key supporters of the 
president’s decision to call this year’s early parliamentary elections. 
 
Both Plyushch and Baloha, however, have been cool in their support for a 
coalition with Tymoshenko.   
 
Plyushch, in particular, is a longtime critic of the BYUT leader and an advocate 
for “stability” often at the expense of reform.  In February of 2001, then-Speaker 
Plyushch, then-Prime Minister Yushchenko and then-President Leonid Kuchma 
released a joint public letter condemning Tymoshenko’s participation in protests 
following the murder of investigative journalist Georgiy Gongadze.  Secretly 
recorded tapes of Kuchma appeared to suggest his complicity in Gongadze’s 
kidnapping, which was carried out by Interior Ministry troops (three of whom have 
pled guilty to murder).  The letter chided Tymoshenko and other opposition 
leaders for using Gongadze’s death “as a reason for social disruption.”  
Moreover, the three men wrote, “Anarchy, arbitrary action and unlawfulness will 
not be allowed!”  And they implied that the protests were led by “fascists.” (2)   
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Today, those protests are widely seen as the first important precursor to the 2004 
“Orange Revolution” protests. 
 
Yushchenko has suggested that the joint letter was changed after his signature.  
Plyushch has never clearly disavowed the letter, however.  It is little wonder, 
then, that he has so far been unable to resign himself to a Tymoshenko 
premiership. 
 
Furthermore, reports have surfaced suggesting that Plyushch has been offered 
the Parliamentary Speaker position, should he help forge a coalition not with 
BYuT, but with the party of current Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.  
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions placed first in the election, but so far has been 
unable to form a workable coalition.  (3) 
 
In attempting to defend his decision to withhold his signature from the coalition 
agreement, Plyushch claimed that Yushchenko had not instructed him to sign the 
document.   “Civil servants who work for the presidential service…cannot make 
independent decisions,” he said.  “I have held too few talks with the president to 
make a decision right now.”  (4) 
 
If this is true, it contradicts Yushchenko’s statements in support of a coalition 
between his bloc and Tymoshenko.  “The coalition must be based on the results 
of elections … .  An ‘Orange’ coalition of democratic forces must be formulated in 
parliament,” he said on 8 November.  “I urge everyone to take sufficient steps 
towards the settlement required in order to form a democratic coalition.”  (5) 
 
If Plyushch’s statement is not true and the president actually has urged Plyushch 
to sign the document, it suggests that Yushchenko is unable to control those 
under his direct supervision. 
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The same pattern exists with Yushchenko’s Chief of Staff Baloha.  He also 
publicly has urged all deputies in Yushchenko’s bloc to sign the coalition 
agreement.  Yet two of Baloha’s closest allies within the bloc —Transcarpathians 
Kril and Petiovka—continue to delay.  Is Baloha truly urging them to sign, but to 
no avail?  Or were his statements for public consumption only? 
 
Yushchenko’s former Deputy Chief of Staff Anatoliy Matvienko also recently 
complained that the OU-PSD-BYuT coalition agreement needs revision. 
 
On 8 November, his Sobor party released a statement insisting on consideration 
of new proposals. (6)  The party and Matvienko have signed the coalition 
document already, so this statement could be viewed as an attempt to scuttle the 
existing agreement. 
 
Matvienko since has said he will vote for Tymoshenko to become prime minister, 
but that he “will not vote for the laws” in the agreement.   Since both sides have 
agreed to pass several laws as a condition for the creation of the “orange, 
democratic” majority – prior to a vote on prime minister – this stance could 
jeopardize the majority itself. 
 
All of these individuals are connected closely to Yushchenko, but are not part of 
the administrative apparatus of his political bloc.  The leaders of the bloc publicly 
have called on these holdouts to sign the agreement, but are widely believed to 
lack authority over the closest allies of Yushchenko and Baloha. 
 
It is unclear whether these individuals are attempting to exact personal benefits 
through “negotiating” or whether this is part of an overall backroom attempt to 
scuttle the deal with BYuT.  Yushchenko has never embraced the idea of seeing 
Tymoshenko in the prime minister’s post, since the two may be rivals in the next 
presidential election.   This potential rivalry helped contribute to his decision to 
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dismiss her from the prime minister’s position in 2005, after nine months on the 
job. 
 
The fight for signatures on the coalition document is only one of the delays to 
forming a government.  Despite the fact that six weeks have passed since the 
election, the working group to organize administrative matters for the first 
parliamentary sessions has met only twice with a quorum, on 11 and 12 
November, and has been unable even to choose a chairman. 
 
The delay in meeting was caused by the decision of Yanukovych’s Party of 
Regions to wait until nearly the deadline to register its deputies following the 
election, and to refuse to attend the working group until all deputies were 
registered.  BYuT and OU-PSD attempted to convene three sittings of the 
working group earlier, but waited in vain for representatives of the current ruling 
majority to appear.   OU-PSD and BYUT control 15 out of 30 seats on the group. 
 
The group now has a quorum but no chairman. 
 
Ukraine’s constitution states that the parliament must meet for its first session 
within 30 days of the official announcement of the final results.  The results were 
published on 27 October (almost one month after the election), so parliament 
must meet by 26 November.  (7)  The document provides no recourse if 
parliament does not follow the constitution’s mandate and meet within 30 days. 
 
The majority of politicians—including President Yushchenko—do not appear 
concerned.   But with each passing day, new opportunities develop to undercut 
the existing coalition agreement.  To do so likely would plunge Ukraine into yet 
another political crisis, at a time when it should instead be focusing on reforms.  
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